

THE CHALLENGE TO PEACE RESEARCH IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

It is argued here that humanity is experiencing a fundamental transition in our dominant “world-image,” “world-idea,” or “worldview,” which may be characterized *philosophically* as a transition from “modernity” to “postmodernity.” As part of this transition, it is essential that the main elements of the political architecture of modernity—the nation-state system, the logic of statecraft, and the principle of State sovereignty—be rejected as “dangerously obsolete” and certainly “not benign” in view of the human interest in human solidarity, global peace, and principles of global justice. The challenge to peace research, then, following the expressed hope of world order scholar Richard A. Falk, is to envision or model alternative futures, i.e., “preferred futures,” building on the work of world order scholars of the 1960s and 1970s, i.e., the transnational World Order Models Project (WOMP). As with the former WOMP, this requires that a new generation of peace researchers think about feasible “strategies of transition” and what manner of transformation of international institutional structures, patterns of behavior, and value orientations are likely to address the failures of the modern nation-state system.

I believe that a new geopolitics is struggling to be born and assert itself. It is forging a different global politics that will incorporate by stages the global and human interest and make our understanding of what it means to be a citizen of a political community have an existential planetary dimension and no longer be confined to the geographic national space of sovereign states, and within that, to short-term concerns.

--Richard A. Falk, *Power Shift: On the New Global Order* (2016)

The Modern-Postmodern Transition

Speaking *philosophically*, I suggest that humanity is yet experiencing a fundamental transition in our dominant "world-image," "world-idea," or "worldview" (*Weltanschauung*). This is reasonably to be characterized as the transition from "modernity" to "postmodernity."¹ As philosopher Jacques Derrida opined, "it is quite clear that something is happening at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth for thinking to want to affirm the future."² And, as philosopher Reiner Schürmann observed, "All that European humanity has *made of itself* in the first half of the twentieth century, and all that it is in the process of *doing to itself* on a planetary scale in the second half that makes darkness so familiar to us, must have distant and profound origins."³ Those origins, at least as concerns the domain of the political, we find in Western political philosophy conceived as a "special metaphysics" (*metaphusica specialis*) derivative of, dependent on, and related to a "first philosophy" (*protē philosophia*) that issues "principles" (*archés*), principles that establish a "foundation" to "guarantee certainty in knowledge and rectitude in acting, and to life, perhaps both stability and a meaning,"⁴ but which in the course of time place us into a "dogmatic slumber" from which we might yet hope to awake and are called to awake in our postmodern time.

We are nonetheless mostly unclear as to the goals and consequences of this transition for global humanity, even as there is an uneasy intellectual tension between those who advocate a postmodern disposition and those who defend modernity⁵ (especially among those who champion the philosophy of optimism and scientific/technological progress of the European Enlightenment). That intellectual tension is present also in the writing of those who speak of a supposed "teleological" role of Western reason in achieving what is "essential" or "universal" to humanity, and thus to the elucidation of a "genuine human

¹ For an overview of "postmodernism" in the context of philosophical thought, see Gary Aylesworth, "Postmodernism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2015 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/postmodernism/>, accessed 07 September 2021.

See also Berel Lang, "Postmodernism in Philosophy: Nostalgia for the Future, Waiting for the Past," *New Literary History*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1986, pp. 209-223. In relation to political discourse specifically, see Stephen K. White, *Political Theory and Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

² Jacques Derrida, "Nietzsche and the Machine: Interview with Jacques Derrida by Richard Beardsworth," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, No. 7, 1994, pp. 7-66, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20717600>, accessed 06 September 2021.

³ Reiner Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 3, italics added.

⁴ Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies*, p. 8.

⁵ See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Ben-Habib, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique*, No. 22, Special Issue on Modernism, Winter 1981, pp. 3-14.

nature,"⁶ notwithstanding the relativity and plurality of ethnicities described by cultural and political anthropologists. Despite the claim of Europe's promise of a teleological essence for humanity along with the universality of Western reason, the European political order itself (since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648) has remained a problematic and unstable structure, a mere "balance-of-power" among states. As Robert Cooper asserted, "It was the system in which a war was always waiting to happen."⁷ Moreover, "It is an assumption of the balance-of-power system that states are fundamentally aggressive, or at least that some states are aggressive some of the time."⁸ It has hardly been a promising structure for world order, especially since the "Cold War order" meant that "the old multilateral balance-of-power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide," as the USA and the Soviet Union promised mutually assured destruction if nuclear deterrence failed. The end of the Cold War order in 1989 has not promised an enduring peace, even if under assumptions of a new *Pax Americana*,⁹ Western liberalism, and democracy as a bulwark against totalitarianism.

The problem for our thinking today, however, is precisely to think *how* one is to affirm the future, and to decide *which* future, and *for whom*. Cooper suggests that a "post-modern" Europe began with two treaties – the Treaty of Rome (1957), creating the European Economic Community, what has today become the European Union; and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (1990). The former was a response to the "destructive extremes" of (fascist) nationalism and the consequences of two World Wars, while the latter was designed to diminish state monopoly on armed forces through a more or less balanced "regional" collective security arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.¹⁰ This regional political arrangement and the collective security regime both challenged the

⁶ Consider, e.g., the philosophical disposition of the 20th century phenomenologist Edmund Husserl who, in his *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), spoke of modern philosophies "struggling for their own true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of genuine humanity," including here the assumption that it is necessary "to decide whether the *telos* which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy...is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its *entelechy*." For further exposition, see Dermot Moran, "'Even the Papuan is a Man and not a Beast': Husserl on Universalism and the Relativity of Cultures," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2011, pp. 463-494.

⁷ Robert Cooper, "The Post-modern State and the World Order," *Demos* (The Foreign Policy Center), 15 September 2006, pp. 1-21, at p. 11, <https://fpc.org.uk/the-post-modern-state/>, accessed 26 October 2021,

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁹ See, e.g., Norman K. Swazo, "Primacy or World Order? The New Pax Americana," *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 15-37, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753429>, accessed 26 October 2021. In this paper, I considered "the implications of the Bush Administration's ideology of neoconservative internationalism as a serious challenge to the international legal order." I argued that, "The Bush Administration's abiding emphasis [at the time] on global hegemony, US exceptionalism to international law, and insistence on military preeminence cannot be sustained if there is to be continued progress towards a just and humane world order."

¹⁰ See here Arms Control Association, "The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance," August 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe>, accessed 26 October 2021. "The CFE Treaty was designed to prevent either alliance from amassing forces for a blitzkrieg-type offensive, which could have triggered the use of nuclear weapons in response. Although the threat of such an offensive all but disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, member states have repeatedly touted the enduring value of the treaty's weapons limits and inspection regime, which provides an unprecedented degree of transparency on military holdings."

balance-of-power model of the modern nation-state system, providing impetus to novel thinking about ways to curb the military and expansionist ambitions of sovereign nation-states, at least in Europe. This new European order contributes to thinking about the possibility of other regional arrangements in geopolitical context so as to reduce the probabilities of regional armed conflict. It is thus, perhaps, encouraging, as Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes report from their study, that “In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, the negotiation, adoption, and implementation of international agreements are major elements of the foreign policy activity of every state,” and that “the main focus of treaty practice has moved to multilateral regulatory agreements addressing complex economic, political, and social problems that require cooperative action among states over time.”¹¹ Such is “the new sovereignty.” Yet, even such multilateral engagements do not sufficiently eliminate the “anarchic” spaces of international relations, spaces that do not assure the achievement of a just peace. Such a peace is always an aspiration that seeks to be substantively more than the mere absence of violence between sovereign nation-states.

That said, however, it is important to consider that, in the 1990s, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman asked, “Is the postmodern condition an advance on the moral accomplishments of modernity?”¹² That is an important question in the context of a prospective world order because Western political philosophy or political theory, and thus moral philosophy, has not concerned itself with humanity at large, although there has been ambiguous assertion of “universal moral values” that thereby present us with some enumerated “duties beyond borders” — i.e., duties that are to be performed as a function of the behavior of “political institutions” (such as the modern State) and not merely individuals *per se*.¹³ Bauman’s question is salient in view of the fact that, as Bauman put it, “Postmodernity has dashed modern ambitions of the universal and solidly grounded ethical legislation,” i.e., the goal of having a transcendent, objective, universal morality. Yet, the promise of postmodernity is potent in view of the failures of modernity’s moral and political philosophies, and also in view of their consequential implications for modes of political association. In this sense, I submit, it is reasonable to argue (on the basis of ample historical evidence) that the phase of modernity has been associated with protracted conflicts of diverse political ideologies and sub-national ethnic rivalries.¹⁴

¹¹ Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

¹² Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1993), p.223. See also Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).

¹³ See, e.g., Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Caney argues in favor of “cosmopolitan political morality,” i.e., “cosmopolitanism provides the most plausible position on human rights, distributive justice, political institutions, war, and intervention.” Caney draws on the views of Thomas Pogge (“Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” in Chris Brown, ed. *Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 89-122, at p. 89), who identified several elements of cosmopolitanism: “[first] *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are *human beings, or persons*...[second] *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living being *equally*...[third] *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for *everyone*...”

¹⁴ See, e.g., Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1996). He writes (p. 5): “All ideological belief comprises a set of closely related ideas held by a group...Ideological beliefs supply a broad interpretation of the human condition, ‘a cognitive and moral map of the universe’.” Further (p. 6), “Because of the emotional investment placed in ideological beliefs, they are prone to lapse into dogmatism and hostility towards unbelievers. Passively, a dominant ideology may provide the stability of shared values in a society, but more often ideological thinking demands active policies to safeguard or disseminate specific ideas.”

All of these ideologies are pursued within the dominant political architecture, according to which the principle of State sovereignty has been at its center, hence the “logic of statecraft.” Those who articulate a “realist” view of politics claim that the world is “an arena of conflict,” with each State “pursuing its own interests in world affairs.”¹⁵ As such, at the level of international relations we observe conditions of anarchy¹⁶ in the sense of no effective supranational authority to restrain and constrain nation-states beyond their voluntary consent, notwithstanding the United Nations and the declaratory tradition of international law.¹⁷ Accordingly, the last few centuries have been witness to significant nation-state formation, even as the postcolonial politics of independence has shifted away from the hegemony of historically dominant European powers to national self-affirmation. While this fact is for many a positive development in world political dynamics, it is also true, as Bauman has observed, that “viability has ceased to be a condition of nation-state formation,” that rather than signaling “the ultimate triumph of the nationalist principle” we have instead “the coming end of the age when the social system used to be identified territorially and population-wise with the nation-state...”¹⁸

Questioning the Logic of Statecraft

As noted by many world order scholars and students of modern European history, the logic of statecraft has been with us since the Peace of Westphalia that settled the religious conflict of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in central Europe and installed a “Sovereign Right of Territory” for European powers,¹⁹ subsequently appropriated beyond continental Europe for the structuring of international relations. Moreover, as it has been noted, the right to conduct war has been understood to be “the very hallmark” of State sovereignty,²⁰ even to the point of rejecting the very idea of “any overarching international community on which to ground an ethos of human solidarity.”²¹ In this historical light, one may argue that the fundamental problem of world order that remains with us in the 21st century is this: how to *conceptualize* and *realize* a transition that moves contemporary humanity *beyond* the dominant logic and structure of the modern nation-state system.

It is imperative we understand that the nation-state system is but one of any number of possible structures of a future world order. Indeed, as peace activist Kenneth Boulding was correct to say, war in the 20th century made it abundantly clear that, “a revolution in the art of war...makes the whole existing political structure of the world dangerously obsolete”²²—especially since weapons of mass destruction promise devastation (and not mere destruction) of the Earth.²³ Likewise, we should learn from the view of Indian political

¹⁵ See Janna Thompson, *Justice and World Order: A Philosophical Inquiry* (New York: Routledge, 1992)

¹⁶ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th Ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2012)

¹⁷ See Dorothy V. Jones, “The Declaratory Tradition of International Law,” in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds. *Traditions of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 42-61.

¹⁸ Cassels, p. 231.

¹⁹ The Avalon Project, “Treaty of Westphalia,” https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp, accessed 13 September 2021.

²⁰ See here Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” 23 *British Yearbook of International Law*, 1 (1946).

²¹ Burns H. Weston et al. *International Law and World Order: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook* (West Academic Publishing, 4th edition, 2006) at p. 1285.

²² Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)

²³ Michael Marder, “Devastation,” in Antonio Cerella and Louiza Odysseos, ed. *Heidegger and the Global Age* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), pp. 25-42, refers to the distinction made by Heidegger and adds (p. 26), “Militating against the dwelling, which consists in building and

scientist and world order scholar Rajni Kothari, who once opined that we can no longer reasonably take the State for granted as a “benign” form of political association, given that the pursuit of national interests, including the installation of totalitarian ideology and religious fundamentalism,²⁴ competes with and undermines an essential commitment to the human interest, to human solidarity, to global peace, and to principles of global justice.²⁵ Similarly, as Debjani Ganguly reminds in her engagement of the writing of Edward Said, “The [modern] nation-state, far from being committed to the project of ‘reasonable governance’, is, for Said, the repository of all exclusionary tendencies. Its claims to secularization are chimerical for, as history has shown, it installs the political and cultural allegiances of the majority in its apparatuses and normalizes a discourse of belonging and at-homeness that renders invisible its many violations against those who cannot be accommodated in such discourse.”²⁶ The “State” – and that includes corporate-elitist liberal democratic regimes such as the USA in the assertion of hegemonic power – has been a failure also in view of the 20th century witness to what David Campbell called “the violent deployment of ethnic and historical claims...as a means of determining political struggles.” This has been associated with acts of ethnic cleansing that became acts of genocide – in which case he called for a rethinking of the concept of responsibility with a “deterritorialization” of international relations theory.²⁷

That is an important point: Not only is the nation-state system *not benign*, but it is also *dangerously obsolete*; in which case, those involved in peace research and transnational peace activism should be working towards what world order scholar Richard A. Falk²⁸ termed a transformation of international institutional structures and patterns of behavior beyond mere acceptance of the nation-state system and its outmoded logic of statecraft. This, I submit, is the ongoing challenge for peace research and peace activism in the 21st century. It is all the more imperative when we consider, as I remarked elsewhere, that we are experiencing an “alteration of the Westphalian nation-state into a ‘surveillance state’ or

cultivation, devastation signals a growing impossibility of growing and build-up of homelessness. In contrast to destruction that destroys housing, devastation devastates dwelling, striking not at the actual but at the possible, including the very possibility of actuality. Devastation, *Verwüstung*, is a growing force, a growth, the spread of a desert, *Wüste*, where nothing grows...”

²⁴ See, e.g., Jonathan Fox, “Chapter 1: Fundamentalism Extremism and Politics,” Institute of Policy Studies, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811235504_0001, accessed 14 November 2021; Michael Barkun, “Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter 2003, Special Issue: Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism, ed. Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203010969>, accessed 14 November 2021; Md. Hamid Ansari, “Religion, Religiosity, and World Order,” *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2019, pp. 3-15, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2347798918812263>, accessed 14 November 2021.

²⁵ Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps Into The Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative* (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

²⁶ Debjani Ganguly, *Caste, Colonialism and Counter-Modernity: Notes on a Postcolonial Hermeneutics of Caste* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 20.

²⁷ David Campbell, “The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics After the End of Philosophy,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 455-484, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644818>, accessed 20 December 2020.

²⁸ Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law and Practice, Princeton University, and former North American Director of the World Order Models Project. His initial publication produced as part of the WOMP series can be found in Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1975). More recently, see C.J. Polychroniou, “From a Dysfunctional World Order to a Sustainable Future: An Interview with Richard Falk,” *Global Policy*, 07 January 2020, <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/01/2020/dysfunctional-world-order-sustainable-future-interview-richard-falk>, accessed 02 September 2021. Also, Richard A. Falk, *Power Shift: On the New Global Order* (London: Zed Books, 2016).

'data Leviathan' of extraordinary scope and intrusiveness."²⁹ That is to say, as K. Roth and M. Wang have observed, through "installation of Pavlovian strategies of incentives and disincentives for behavior modification, the surveillance State renders the formerly 'free' political relation of the individual to 'the State' increasingly one that contributes to a dystopian normalization of totalitarian rule." The effect is "to eliminate the very notion of a 'private' domain of life and to permit mass arbitrary detention according to malign 'national security' designs hostile to individual freedoms long championed as fundamental human rights."³⁰

The imperative is furthermore urgent in view of the ongoing evidence of ecological imbalance associated with anthropogenic causes of climate change and ongoing peril to sustainability of ecosystems across the globe. Falk warned of this prospect long ago in his *This Endangered Planet*,³¹ even as it remains clear from the most recent international discussions on climate change at COP26³² that the nation-state system is itself a barrier to efficacious transnational action required to avoid planetary peril by mid-century. As COP26 President Alok Sharma remarked at the conclusion of the meeting and the issuance of the Glasgow Climate Pact, "I would say...that this is a fragile win. We have kept 1.5 [degrees C.] alive. That was our overarching objective when we set off on this journey two years ago...But I would say the pulse of 1.5 is weak...What this will be judged on, is not just the fact that countries have signed up, but on whether they meet and deliver on the commitments." In a situation of voluntary commitments the promise of COP26 is limited by the fact that there remains a "broken promise" of climate finance: "Twelve years ago, at a United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen, rich nations made a significant pledge. They promised to channel US\$100 billion a year to less wealthy nations by 2020, to help them adapt to climate change and mitigate further rises in temperature."³³

In addition to such empirical concerns, there was a time when it was reasonable to speak, as the 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant did, of the prospect of perpetual

²⁹ Norman K. Swazo, "Un-Promethean Science and the Future of Humanity: Heidegger's Warning," *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, Vol. 43 No. 33, 2021, pp. 1-27, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-021-00380-z>, accessed 05 September 2021. I refer here to K. Roth and M. Wang, "Data Leviathan: China's Burgeoning Surveillance State," *The New York Review of Books*, <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/08/16/data-leviathan-chinas-burgeoning-surveillance-state/>, accessed 08 September 2019.

³⁰ Chenyan Ding has recently commented on the same in the People's Republic of China specifically, taking note of the PRC's Cyberspace Administration's regulation for control of "network information content," which works to "mitigate" and "control" "negative public opinions...which depart from or conflict with the mainstream ideologies and official opinions," aiming thereby to "promote positive energy and dispose of illegal and harmful network information based upon cultivating and practicing core socialist values..." See here Chenyan Ding, "Fatal Lack of Information Transparency in Public Health Emergency: Lessons from the COVID-19 Outbreak in China." *Hong Kong Law Journal*, City University of Hong Kong School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-015, City University Hong Kong Centre for Chinese and Comparative Law Research Paper Series Paper No. 2020/025. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715380>, accessed 28 November 2021.

³¹ Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival* (New York: Random House, 1971).

³² UN Climate Change Conference UK 2021, COP 26, "Uniting the World to Tackle Climate Change," <https://ukcop26.org>, accessed 14 November 2021. See also "COP President Concluding Media Statement," <https://ukcop26.org/cop-president-concluding-media-statement/>, accessed 14 November 2021.

³³ Jocelyn Timperley, "The broken \$100-billion promise of climate finance—and how to fix it," *Nature*, 20 October 2021, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02846-3>, accessed 14 November 2021.

peace.³⁴ Now, in the post-9/11 era, national security discourse has contributed a novel yet disquieting concept of “endless war” with its “psychology of terror” and “endless terror” with an ambiguous definition of ‘terrorist’ – as evident in the prelude to George W. Bush’s launch of “the war on terror,” begun on 19 March 2003 with the attack on Iraq, all a manufactured illusory threat in view of the real objective of regime change. As it has been said:

Wars take on an endless character when two conditions are met: First, when a belligerent adopts objectives while lacking the capability to achieve said objectives. Second, when, despite the ability to achieve its objectives, the belligerent is also not at risk of being defeated itself. Where these two conditions hold over a prolonged period of time with no clear possibility of change in sight, endless war emerges.³⁵

Even so, we are not to be fooled by the legal rationalizations (submitted for the presumed “just cause” to conduct war) of *targeted* killing as opposed to *indiscriminate* killing as somehow “more humane.” The fact is that the technologies of war are presumed, *falsely*, to reduce “collateral” effect or “double” effect, while nonetheless permitting inordinate civilian deaths and destruction of vital civilian infrastructure (as is evident from so-called “counter-terrorism operations” in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, that have sought “regime change” rather than *bona fide* nation-building).³⁶ The modern “national security” State, in short, promises no national security even as it diminishes the prospect of international security through a spurious doctrine of endless war. Falk stated the assessment accurately in writing: “The entire world, without much respect for boundaries and sovereign rights, has become a global battlefield in which the so-called ‘War on Terror’ is being waged between two non-Westphalian entities” – i.e., the USA as “the first ‘global state’” and “non-territorial extremist networks (Al Qaeda, ISIS).”³⁷ In short, Falk opines, we have here a “post-Westphalian non-territorial reconfiguration of conflict that currently controls the political imagination in the West.”

That said, it is also notable that, writing at the turn of the century, Rajni Kothari observed what he called the “erosion of a state-centered world” and commented: “The most striking feature of the emerging reality is that the structures for managing issues and dealing

³⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, trans. David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). It is to be noted as well, however, that when Kant articulated his concept of the State he did so, as Jeremy Waldron says (“Kant’s Theory of the State,” p. 187): “The state is a morally significant entity by virtue of the tasks it takes on, the spirit in which it addresses them, and the resources it brings to those tasks. If it acts as though it embodies the united will of the whole people, operating through the medium of general laws, and deploying effective and coordinated force to secure an environment governed by those laws, then it is legitimate and the people must submit to it.”

³⁵ New America, “Endless War: A Term with a History and a Definition,” <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/defining-endless-wars/endless-war-a-term-with-a-history-and-a-definition/>, accessed 06 September 2021. See also, Andrew J. Bacevich, “Ending Endless War: A Pragmatic Military Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 95, No. 5, September/October 2016, pp. 36-44, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43946954.pdf>, accessed 06 September 2021.

³⁶ See here, Samuel Moyn, “How the US created a world of endless war,” *The Guardian*, 31 August 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/31/how-the-us-created-a-world-of-endless-war>, accessed 06 September 2021.

³⁷ Richard A. Falk, “Reading Elizabeth Weber’s Kill Boxes,” <https://richardfalk.org/category/derrida/>, accessed 08 September 2021. Falk here reprints the text of his “Afterword” to Weber’s book, *Kill Boxes: Facing the Legacy of US-Sponsored Torture, Indefinite Detention, and Drone Warfare* (Punctum Books, 2017).

with problems, whether in terms of world affairs or of encouraging institutions and leadership within individual societies, are becoming more and more incoherent.”³⁸ Indeed, he observed further, despite the adherence to the logic of statecraft among proponents of *Realpolitik* and despite assertions of State sovereignty, “We have already entered a period in which both nation-states and political processes are being asked to take a back seat.” Hence, the process of globalization (while contested in some quarters) and evolving global political and economic interdependence mean that we are undergoing a time of transformation not entirely subject to the control of State actors. The key question, relative to a standard of practical rationality (what has otherwise been called “normative science” or “ethics in international affairs”), is whether this transformation occurs as a matter of mere *drift* or comes about as an object of more or less rational *design* (as world order scholar Saul Mendlovitz once put the question).³⁹

The Task of Transforming Normative Orientations

We should be clear that a transformation of normative or philosophical orientations cannot but include interrogating traditional doctrines of *just war* theory also (for both the *jus ad bellum* and the *jus in bello*), as well as thinking also of a reasonable configuration of a *just peace*.⁴⁰ A just war is presumed to aim at a resolution of armed conflict normally construed as a formalized peace, e.g., by way of a bilateral or multilateral treaty or accord. But such settlements do not necessarily entail a just peace, i.e., a peace that instantiates justice in contrast to a commitment to abstain from direct violence without committing to more than that.

‘Just peace’ may be understood, as Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller suggest, as “a process whereby peace and justice are reached together by two or more parties recognizing each others’ identities, each renouncing some central demands, and each accepting to abide by common rules jointly developed.”⁴¹ Further, “Just peace is morally superior to ‘stable peace’ where no party considers the possibility of threatening force and the idea of a war stays totally outside of cognition in terms of its practice.” In proposing such a concept, Allan and Keller also opine there are “limits of the liberal theory of the ‘law of nations’ [*jus gentium*],”⁴² inasmuch as “it had been devised and applied to justify the extinction or assimilation of indigenous peoples,” and insofar as it presented as a “homogenizing legal discourse...trapped in a European vision of international relations.” In contrast, what is needed now is a “principle of recognition” of peoples that involves both a people’s right to exist (“thin recognition”) and there is *bona fide* effort “to understand the other’s fundamental features of identity” (“thick recognition”), both of which contribute to “an intersubjective consensus of what each side profoundly needs to remain ‘self’, and thus, satisfied...”⁴³ To this is added the convention of “renouncement” – “concessions and compromises are

³⁸ Rajni Kothari, “Globalization: A World Adrift,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr-Jun, 1997), pp. 227-267, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644889>, accessed 31 August 2021.

³⁹ Saul Mendlovitz, ed. *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, eds. *What is a Just Peace?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 195.

⁴² For further discussion see Oliver P. Richmond, *Peace in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2008), in particular Chapter 1, “Peace and the idealist tradition: Towards a liberal peace.” Here Richmond reminds (p. 23), “The core liberal assumptions are of universal rationality, individual liberty, connected with the idealist possibility – if not probability – of harmony and cooperation in domestic and international relations, and of the need for enlightened, rational, legitimate domestic government and international governance.”

⁴³ *Ibid.* pp. 198, 199.

necessary to build a Just Peace.”⁴⁴ Finally, the authors propose, “Just Peace cannot be only in the minds of peoples, a subjective feeling among negotiators, a sentiment of justice and peace between them. For a Just Peace to be durable, it needs to be shown in the open, in the public sphere. It requires explicit rules of settlement, legitimate rules of acceptable behaviour, and objective yardsticks allowing all—both parties and outside observers or guarantors—to approve the solution found.”⁴⁵

While allowing for the possibility of a just peace that is not dependent on a settlement consequent to a presumably just war (i.e., it has met the criteria of just war), just war theory has more or less presupposed the legitimacy of the nation-state system and the principle of State sovereignty as the source of authority in the authorization of armed conflict. If the late 20th century has taught us anything in view of the development and deployment of sophisticated weapons technologies, including new generations of weapons of mass destruction with kill power far beyond what was experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki,⁴⁶ it should be this: that the prevention of war and reduction of political conflict require the modification of political ideologies in the direction of coalescing normative orientations that privilege the human interest over parochial, State interests. This must be coordinate with continuing efforts of nuclear disarmament—strategic arms limitation (as in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT) and/or reduction (as in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, START), along with policies of “anti-proliferation,” i.e., preventing both nuclear arms proliferation internationally and “vertical” proliferation of new/modernized weapons systems that threaten planet-wide devastation.⁴⁷

Kenneth Boulding understood the concept ‘modification of ideology’ to mean the modification of a person’s or a society’s “world-image” — “an image of the world [that has] power over a man’s mind and that leads him to build his personal identity around it.” This unavoidably involves transformation of normative or value orientations, of course. But, it will not do to seek such a transformation without insisting on the essential transformation that seeks to undo allegiance to, or mere acquiescence in, the dominant political paradigm of the nation-state system. That is why modeling the future of the world order, thinking about possible futures, envisioning “preferred futures,” remains essential even as such modeling was part of the work of the Institute for World Order and the transnational World Order Models Project (WOMP) in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 201.

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 203-204.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., “Types of Nuclear Weapons,” Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, 31 October 1961, <https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed 06 September 2021; Federation of American Scientists, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>, accessed 06 September 2021. According to the latter, “the world’s combined inventory of nuclear warheads remains at a very high level: Nine countries possessed roughly 13,100 warheads as of early-2021,” stockpiles and reserves of 5,500 in the USA and stockpiles and retired of 6,257 in Russia, approximately 2,000 of US, Russian, British, and French warheads on “high alert,” with ongoing modernization.

⁴⁷ See Saul Mendlovitz, “Nuclear Arms and World Public Order: A Transformational Perspective,” *NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 419-525, https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol4/iss2/13, accessed 01 September 2021. Mendlovitz opined (p. 422): “We need to engage in demilitarization. Such a process will require the development of an alternative security system to the one we presently utilize. The fact is, national security in a decentralized, militarized system in which unilateral military decisions are made by national elites, is no longer capable of insuring security and has a high likelihood of producing serious disaster for the human race.”

⁴⁸ See here, Amanda Dugan, “The World Order Models Project,” World Policy Institute, 07 March 2012, <http://worldpolicy.org/2012/03/07/the-world-order-models-project/>, accessed 01 September

As international law has developed with reference to the logic of statecraft and the *declaratory* tradition⁴⁹ of international law, academic interest in such modeling has diminished, granted. But, such modeling activity remains pertinent to thinking about the future of the state of global affairs *as a world order* and not merely as a system of *international relations*. Falk has been persuasive in suggesting, even urging, a revival of WOMP involving a new generation of scholars.⁵⁰ In view of where we are politically today in international relations in the early 21st century, it remains entirely apropos and urgent that we have diversely articulated visions (i.e., preferred futures) of the future world order and that peace researchers think through meaningful and feasible “strategies of transition” in the manner in which WOMP scholars did with reference to a set of values.

Accordingly, I submit that Falk is correct to frame the possibility of a new generation of world order thinking with reference to a desired set of values—“peace; social, political, and environmental justice; developmental and ecological sustainability; global citizenship and transnational identities”). And, while there can be and has been transnational ethical agreement about the desirability and coherence of this set of values, there is likely to be disagreement about what these values entail for the actual structure of the world order and relations of peoples (to distinguish this from the concept of relations of States). This is especially so in the context of manifest fast-moving globalization and corresponding global political and economic interdependence, while post-colonial developing nations champion a “beyond dependency” perspective on nation-building and a priority of national economic development, in particular in terms of recently articulated Sustainable Development Goals. Accordingly, given the probability of disagreement, it is incumbent upon proponents of world order change to commit to *an ethics of disagreement* as well.⁵¹

This is especially important in view of the inescapable fact that there are diverse and “rival” concepts of *justice* even as these are part and parcel of diverse and “competing” *practical rationalities*⁵² that frame contemporary political discourse. An ethics of disagreement properly construed includes attention to both *intellectual* responsibility and *moral* responsibility, as Robert Audi has argued.⁵³ Indeed, Audi reminds, “Given such

2021; Amanda Dugan, “Toward a New Global Platform,” World Policy Institute, 10 March 2012, <http://worldpolicy.org/2012/03/10/toward-a-new-global-platform/>, accessed 01 September 2021. Richard Falk has opined: “Present circumstances of challenge would make a new venture along similar methodological lines both illuminating and possibly politically relevant, and certainly of intellectual interest.” See here, <https://richardfalk.org/category/world-order-models-project/>, accessed 08 September 2021.

⁴⁹ See Jones, “The Declaratory Tradition of International Law,” *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ Richard A. Falk, “Shall we revive the World Order Models Project (WOMP)? Exploring horizons of desire in the early twenty-first century,” in Richard A. Falk, *(Re)Imagining Humane Global Governance* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁵¹ See, e.g., Manuel Knoll, “Deep Disagreements on Values, Justice, and Moral Issues: Towards an Ethics of Disagreement,” *TRAMES*, 24(74/69), 3, 2020, pp. 315-338, <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2020.3.04>, accessed 01 September 2021. Knoll clarifies: “Deep disagreements are disagreements in good faith that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments” consequent to “a clash of ‘underlying principles’ or ‘framework propositions’.” See also, Ryan Fanselow, “Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics,” *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 2011, pp. 1-16;

⁵² Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988)

⁵³ Robert Audi, “The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement,” *Philosophy*, Vol. 86, 2011, <https://doi.10.1017/S0031819110000586>, accessed 01 September 2021.

substantial and often divisive disagreement on central questions of human life, it is important that we have a good account of how a rational, intellectually responsible person deals with disagreement.” This is so for mundane matters of private and public life, but it is all the more so for those who propose to defend one or another peace research methodology, this or that value orientation, and one or another vision or preferred future of a prospective world order and the strategies of transition from the present.

The concept of “ethics in international affairs” has included a tradition of discourse operating on the central assumption that “it is the moral behavior of *states* that should be the main or at least the primary focus.”⁵⁴ This view, of course, is distinct from that of *Realpolitik* insofar as realists do not admit to a normative dimension to international affairs. Yet, precisely in view of one or another normative account of world politics, a postmodern orientation reasonably calls into question personal and collective identity focused on the nation-state *per se* and even the concept of ‘citizen’ in this structural frame. Rather, there is a need for protest against the very concept of ‘the citizen’ (a concept having its antiquated history, more or less formally expressed initially in Aristotle’s *Politics* but modified in modern liberal political theory such as from Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant), even as there is a need to overcome Western political-philosophical dichotomies in concept and practice— *bios theoretikos/bios politikos*; *theoria/praxis*; -archy/an-archy; ruler/ruled; Sovereign/subject; State/citizen; citizen/refugee.

Beyond ‘Citizenship’ *per se*

One must be mindful of the historical prejudice that is sustained in this dominant concept of citizenship, given that the concept has been transformed—from the relation of *politēs* to the *polis* or “city-state” in ancient Greece to being tied to the modern conception of the citizen in the “nation-state” that is by no means the equivalent of the Greek *polis*.⁵⁵ I submit that this protest is imperative if one is not to be complicit in sustaining what is no longer a working peace system, if ever it was (modern history and contemporary events providing evidence that it has not been and is not so). Of course, peace researchers and world order scholars have proposed, as an alternative, a commitment to the concept of “global citizenship,” albeit usually without advocating a “world-state.” Yet, even this concept is problematic in view of the “scandal of the refugee” prominent in contemporary politics, as characterized by political scientist Michael Dillon:

The refugee is a scandal for philosophy in that the refugee recalls the radical instability of meaning and the incalculability of the human. The refugee is a scandal

⁵⁴ Nicholas Rengger, “Conclusion: The task(s) of international ethics,” in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, ed. *Ethics and International Affairs: Extent and Limits* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 264-278.

⁵⁵ One has in mind here the position articulated by Derrida, “Nietzsche and the Machine,” *op. cit.* pp. 46 & 47. Commenting on his sense of solidarity with others, Derrida says: “For example, if I feel in solidarity today with this particular Algerian who is caught between the F.I.S. and the Algerian state, or this particular Croat, Serbian, or Bosnian, or this particular South African, this particular Russian or Ukrainian, or whoever,—it’s not a feeling of one citizen towards another, it’s not a feeling peculiar to a citizen of the world, as if we were all potential or imaginary citizens of a great state. No, what binds me to these people is something different than membership in a world nation-state or an international community extending indefinitely the limits of what one still calls today ‘the nation-state’. What binds me to them—and this is the point; there is a bond, but this bond cannot be contained within traditional concepts of community, obligation or responsibility—is a protest against citizenship a protest against membership of a political configuration as such. This bond is, for example, a form of political solidarity opposed to the political *qua* a politics tied to the nation-state.”

for politics also, however, in that the advent of the refugee is always a reproach to the formation of the political order or subjectivity which necessarily gives rise to the refugee. The scandal is intensified for any politics of identity which presupposes that the goal of politics is the realization of sovereign identity.⁵⁶

Dillon's words here are not to be gainsaid for their pointed indictment of the modern State: It is this formation of political "order" and ostensibly representative "subjectivity" that has given rise to the refugee—s/he who is made *State-less* and, therefore, depreciated and diminished in his and her political identity and human dignity, given that both personal and collective identities are customarily, juridically, associated with the goal of modern politics, i.e., the realization of *personal* identity within the overarching concept of *sovereign* identity—what Nevzat Soguk calls "the state-centric imagination of the world."⁵⁷

Soguk reminds that, "[e]normous political, social, and technological changes and transformations are triggering mass movements of people in search of 'better' and 'safer' places," people who are "suffering or affected by poverty, famine, natural disasters, military coups, civil wars, or slow-working societal disjunctures, or enamored with the 'imagined possibilities' of other 'homelands' in distant places"—in short, "a steady flux of people is expanding the world's 'refugee' population." These facts indict the modern nation-state for its failure to secure both life and livelihood, despite its claim to assure "national security," promote the "domestic welfare,"⁵⁸ and secure a genuine "civic culture"⁵⁹ (the failure evident in the scandal of the refugee wherein *communalist* identity overwhelms a more comprehensive *civic* identity). It is as if the predicted "revolution of rising expectations" and the "revolution of rising frustrations" of the have-nots of "the global South" have merged to challenge the presumptions of territorial sovereignty and to press for a long-neglected global distributive justice.

⁵⁶ Michael Dillon, "'Epilogue: The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the 'Inter' of International Relations," *Refuge*, Vol. 17, No. 6, December 1998, 30-39.

⁵⁷ Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 2.

⁵⁸ See here, "A Good Life For All Within Planetary Boundaries," <https://goodlife.leeds.ac.uk/>, accessed 20 November 2021. The report here claims, "For at least the last 30 years, no country has met the basic needs of its residents at a globally sustainable level of resource use." Indeed, "Countries have been transgressing planetary boundaries faster than they have been meeting the basic needs of their residents." Reference here is to Andrew L. Fanning, Daniel W. O'Neill, Jason Hickel, Nicolaus Rouz, "The social shortfall and ecological overshoot of nations," *Nature Sustainability*, 18 November 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-021-00799-z>, accessed 20 November 2021.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., Thomas Bridges, *The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Bridges writes (p. 23), e.g., "Liberal democracy assumes that citizens are adherents of particularistic concepts of the good life. It assumes that citizens are members of ethnic, class, and religious communities with competing interests and clashing world views. The rhetorical task of any civic culture is to win the allegiance of all citizens to a common set of civic values" and, thereby, "to develop the moral capacities required for citizenship." Thus, "Modernist liberal political theory, presented in foundationalist theoretical discourses, defined citizenship in essentialist terms (i.e., they defined the civic standpoint of free and equal individuality as the essential or natural standpoint of every human being" (p. 36). Now, however, we are faced with the rhetorical task of "inventing a *postmodern, post-Enlightenment* civic culture" (p. 33, emphasis added)—how to do so, however, yet a problem for the modern/postmodern transition. Bridges argued (p. 40), "a postmodern culture must represent and affirm citizenship as an ideal that is contingent, particularistic, and culturally constructed."

Yet, if we were to be successful in disabusing personal identity of the concept of “the State” and the notion of “citizenship *in a State*,” then the “imaginary geography” at the center of modernity’s logic of statecraft would be duly undermined;⁶⁰ and so would the problem of the refugee who is denominated a person without *topos*, without lawful *place*, without a juridically secured *home* in “the State.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that approximately “82.4 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced at the end of 2020 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order.”⁶¹ Some 48 million are “internally displaced people.”

These facts are part and parcel of the empirical evidence that justifies Dillon’s indictment of the nation-state system for the scandal of the refugee and that argue for rethinking our commitment to this political architecture. All political concepts associated with the modern State manifest their *instability of meaning*, as Michael Dillon observes, but also their *instability in function* (and hence their loss of normative authority), in which case these facts are instructive for peace researchers today in challenging the presumed legitimacy of the nation-state and the presumed authority of the logic of statecraft. In the absence of a fundamental revision, the future of the world order remains in peril from one or another emergent catastrophe⁶²--even to the point that a national leader decides to exercise the “Hiroshima temptation”⁶³ or, worse, intent on “total war”⁶⁴ appeals to the “supreme emergency exemption” to the intentional killing of innocents,⁶⁵ the consequence of

⁶⁰ The question at issue here is whether one may think and act in a way that sets aside “the state-centric definitions of citizenship that obscure the larger questions of whether one can act as a human rather than as a citizen of a particular state.” See here, Simon Dalby, “Against ‘Globalization from Above’: Critical Geopolitics and the World Order Models Project,” Paper for Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, July 1988.

⁶¹ United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “Figures at a Glance,” <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>, accessed 07 September 2021.

⁶² See Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies*, 3rd Ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

⁶³ Robert J. Lifton, in his “Foreword” to Sherwin’s *A World Destroyed* (p. xiii), uses this expression originating from Richard A. Falk, the expression meaning someone “deciding to employ a small nuclear weapon against a country that cannot retaliate because it possesses no nuclear weapons.” As Sherwin also reminds (p. xxiv), former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “popularized” the idea of “limited nuclear war” in 1958 in his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, an idea that was “then adopted in 1980 as Presidential Directive-59 by the Carter Administration.”

⁶⁴ See here, Hew Strachan, “Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War,” *The International History Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 341-370, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40108371>, accessed 03 October 2021.

⁶⁵ The concept of supreme emergency is from Michael Walzer in his *Just and Unjust Wars*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), although, as Christopher Toner remarks, Winston Churchill first used the concept in a speech (see International Churchill Society, “‘Be Ye Men of Valour’: First Broadcast as Prime Minister to the British People,” 19 May 1940, <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/be-ye-men-of-valour/>, accessed 03 October 2021). For elaboration and critique, see Toner’s “Just War and the Supreme Emergency Exemption,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 221, October 2005, 545-561. Basically, an appeal to a supreme emergency entails override of the just war principle of discrimination that prohibits the killing of innocents when otherwise under armed conflict they are granted non-combatant immunity.

It is to be noted that the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, rendered on 08 July 1996, advised (in an 11-3 majority opinion) that, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” With reference to international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, the ICJ emphasized

which is not only mutually assured destruction but also *devastation of the Earth*, the whole of humanity and the planet immersed into what Falk has rightly called “the crucible of tragedy and catastrophe.”⁶⁶ ‘Tragedy’ is indeed the fitting word, precisely because undeniably yet inexorably we thereby choose our sordid fate even as Sophocles’ Oedipus unwittingly made decisions that cast his own fate.

There are calls to renovate our thinking of the political,⁶⁷ and it is incumbent upon us to do so in affirmation of the future and of humanity⁶⁸ without succumbing to mere drift and the inertia of the political architecture of modernity. We should do so also mindful of the phenomenon of *enantiodromia* that is operative in politics, as the cultural historian William Irwin Thompson reminded many years ago, which phenomenon reveals to us the possibility that in seeking to do good we end up achieving its opposite.⁶⁹ In view of the foregoing deliberation, I submit that it is long past time for peace researchers once again to take up the challenge of articulating value preferences and then envisioning and modeling preferred futures in the interest of humanity at large, all the while accounting for the plurality of concepts of both justice and practical rationality. Accordingly, we may yet achieve a just and humane world order as part of a persistent moral duty to future generations.⁷⁰ Rather than continue our commitment to the idea of the nation-state or the

that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets...” More important to the issue of legitimacy of use of such weapons is the Court’s observation that, it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” The latter observation means, in short, that *in practice* a State is not prohibited from appealing to a situation of supreme emergency as justification for the use of nuclear weapons—clearly a morally unwelcome *aporia* in the Court’s overall engagement of the question. See here, International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Overview of the Case, <https://web.archive.org/web/20171018153630/http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95>, accessed 13 October 2021. For a review of the ICJ opinion, see Richard A. Falk, “Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter,” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 64-75, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2954141>, accessed 13 October 2021.

⁶⁶ Richard A. Falk, “Anarchism and World Order,” *Nomos*, Vol. 19, 1978, pp. 63-87, p. 76, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219039>, accessed 07 October 2021.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Bernard P. Dauenhauer, “Renovating the Problem of Politics,” *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 29, No. 4, June 1976, pp. 626-641, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126847>, accessed 16 September 2021. In talking about the relation of ruler and ruled, Dauenhauer reminds (p. 633), “The legitimate exercise of command is not directed toward bringing the body politic to a condition of radical completion or stasis. It is, rather, aimed at effecting a displacement away from the repetitious performance of routines toward performances which respond to the ever distinctive proximate and remote possibilities which each historical moment grants.” Further, “What counts as legitimate political conduct and legitimate command must henceforth be judged in global and not in local terms.” See also Norman K. Swazo, *Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002).

⁶⁸ Hannah Arendt, in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & world, 1966), p. 60, wrote that, if one accepts a Hobbesian political philosophy, one excludes the very “idea of humanity” inasmuch as “Hobbes affords the best possible theoretical foundation for those naturalistic ideologies which hold nations to be tribes, separated from each other by nature...unconscious of the solidarity of mankind and having in common only the instinct of self-preservation which man shares with the animal world.” The consequence of this political philosophy or ideological appeal is that, absent the idea of humanity, “all together are predestined by nature to war against each other until they have disappeared from the face of the earth.”

⁶⁹ William Irwin Thompson, *Evil and World Order* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976)

⁷⁰ There are, of course, those who argue that we in the present do not have duties to future generations. See, e.g., Dennis Earl, “Ontology and the Paradox of Future Generations,” *Public Reason*:

idea of a (supranational) global state, even a so-called “cosmopolis”⁷¹ that retains elements of the “cosmopolitanism” of the metaphysics of modernity, I submit that *we should appropriate a political consciousness of moral obligation to the Earth as our one and only true home.* With this essential moral resolve, the antiquated concept of ‘citizen’ transforms into a postmodern concept of the human as *Terran*,⁷² i.e., as *one who dwells on the Earth with care and knows what it means to be a dweller.*

This word, ‘*Terran*’, I submit, should be at the heart of our primary normative orientation, thus to *bestow, ground, and begin*⁷³ our authentic postmodern political identity. How does it bestow, ground, and begin that sense of identity? Rafael Winkler, in his engagement of philosopher Martin Heidegger’s thought on dwelling, remarks: “...to dwell is to become-at-home on the earth and this becoming-at-home is what fulfils the vocation of man as a historical being.”⁷⁴ An historical vocation involves not only a people’s tradition of words, thoughts, and deeds past. It also involves that people’s historical destiny, which calls for a people to think about and anticipate the contours of its future. In such destiny is what Heidegger calls a “distant injunction” (*ferne Verfügung*) that lays out a course, a heading, for those attuned to that call. Through this attunement, a people may (to use Heidegger’s words here) “break the hegemony of the tradition.”⁷⁵ That means a people must question its heritage in view of its collective potentiality-for-being, but this in relation to the aspirations of the *authentic selfhood* of all who identify themselves to be “associated” socio-culturally and politically as and for *the manner of being* of that “people.” To anticipate

Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 1, June 2011, pp. 73-78; Oliver Marc Hartwich, “The Rights of the Future?” *Policy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Spring 2009, pp. 3-8; Jan Narveson, “Duties to, and Rights of, Future Generations: An Impossibility Theorem,” <https://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Narveson.pdf>, accessed 05 October 2021.

⁷¹ See Fred R. Dallmayr, who speaks of a “transition from Westphalia to cosmopolis” in his *Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2013) with a commitment to “global citizenship” (Chap. 4, “Humanizing Humanity: Education for World Citizenship”), although he is correct to opine that, “cosmopolitanism in our time cannot assume a homogeneous global community but has to proceed through cross-cultural dialogue.” In this respect, Dallmayr is consonant with the perspective taken by world order scholar Ali Mazrui in his *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

⁷² I take the term from science fiction author Ursula K. LeGuin, *The Dispossessed* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1974), the word deriving from the Latin *terra*, for “earth”. I use the word ‘dwell’ deliberately, since the term has significant implications for the renovation of the political. See, e.g., Bernard P. Dauenhauer, “Heidegger, Spokesman for the Dweller,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 189-199. See also, Sophia Hatzisavvidou, “Dwelling Politically: Reading Heidegger in the ‘Anthropocene,’” and Fred R. Dallmayr, “World Order and *Abendland*: Heidegger on Global Renewal,” in Antonio Cerella and Louiza Odysseos, ed. *Heidegger and the Global Age* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). I note also the statement from Rafael Winkler, “Dwelling and Hospitality: Heidegger and Hölderlin,” *Research in Phenomenology*, Vol. 47, 2017, pp. 366-387, at p. 371, in his engagement of Heidegger’s thought on dwelling: “...to dwell is to become-at-home on the earth and this becoming-at-home is what fulfils the vocation of man as a historical being.” Thus, for Heidegger, Earth “is understood neither as a site of technological use and exploitation nor as a site of aesthetic contemplation and pleasure. It is understood in relation to the historical vocation of a people” (p. 372). Further (p. 379), “the hospitality ‘of’ the foreigner is the necessary condition of possibility of dwelling,” which clearly contrasts to the modernist assertions of a territorial sovereignty that at once includes and excludes according to the differentiation of ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’.

⁷³ The notion of bestowing, grounding, and beginning comes from Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), pp. 15-86.

⁷⁴ Winkler, “Dwelling and Hospitality: Heidegger and Hölderlin,” p. 371.

⁷⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Ponderings II-VI, Black Notebooks 1931-1938*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), No. 132, p. 38.

the future is not to repeat the past but to revision it. And, that revision likely includes a dedicated “radical” interrogation of that people’s tradition (i.e., at and from its roots), even to the end of demythologizing the origin and all that was installed as a governing narrative of laws, customs, beliefs, and practices.⁷⁶ Every revision thereby privileges the call of the future over the governance of the past, yields to the openness of the future rather than to the superintendence of a tradition that has willy-nilly become merely the hegemony of dogma.

Further, every individual is a member of a people that has its history but also its own vocation within the more comprehensive history of humanity. This latter history is largely metaphysical in the sense of “first philosophy” mentioned at the outset of this essay. In the present, the metaphysics of our day is manifest in the planetary rule of technology regardless of the past history of any given society or culture and regardless of any and all communalist expressions of value preferences for sociopolitical organization. But, for Heidegger, properly conceived, Earth “is understood neither as a site of technological use and exploitation nor as a site of aesthetic contemplation and pleasure. It is understood in relation to the historical vocation of a people.”⁷⁷ This requires, therefore, that we ask, reflectively as well as with a view to time future: What is the particular historical vocation of a given people? And, in asking this question we should be clear that does not mean a people as now structured by the modern nation-state. The scope of history that informs us must not be constrained by the imaginary geography that has defined either political modernity or that defines contemporary geopolitics. Further, again heeding Winkler, “the hospitality ‘of’ [i.e., that *belongs to*] the foreigner is the necessary condition of possibility of dwelling.”⁷⁸ Such a view of hospitality clearly contrasts to the modernist political assertions of a nation-state “territorial sovereignty” that at once includes and excludes according to the differentiation of ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. Part of conceptualizing what it is to be a dweller involves conceptualizing the duty of hospitality owed the foreigner who ever remains first and foremost a member of a shared humanity irrespective of the time and place of his or her existence.⁷⁹ In this way one moves beyond the dichotomy of ‘citizen/alien’ to envision a transition from merely *co-existent* peoples to their eventual cultural *convergence*, and ultimately to a culturally *coalescent* planetary dwelling of humanity defined as an authentic association of “Terrans” indeed.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ One sees this, e.g., in the modern era’s demythologization of Christianity and Judaism in the West (Immanuel Kant’s *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*; Benedict Spinoza’s *Theologico-Political Treatise*; Rudolf Bultmann’s *New Testament and Mythology*; Shlomo Sand’s *The Invention of the Jewish People*; Yoram Hazony’s *The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture*; David Hartmann’s *Israelis and the Jewish Tradition: An Ancient People Debating Its Future*), as well as in calls for demythologization of the Brahmanic cultural metaphysics in South Asia that has long sustained the injustice of the caste structure of Indian society (B.R. Ambedkar’s *The Annihilation of Caste and Riddles in Hinduism*).

⁷⁷ Heidegger, *Ponderings*, p. 372.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 379.

⁷⁹ For a contemporary philosophical account of hospitality, see Jacques Derrida, *On Hospitality* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

⁸⁰ I use the words ‘coexistence’, ‘convergence’, and ‘coalescence’ in the sense expounded by African world order scholar Ali Mazrui in his contributed WOMP volume, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).